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Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare eects of trade liberalization when some individu-
als suer from self-control problems and hence consume too much of goods which
generate immediate benets but entail future costs. Within a classic Ricardian
model of trade, the welfare eects depend crucially on the direction of trade. In
the importing country, individuals who are suciently price-sensitive and have a
suciently strong self-control problem lose from trade. In the exporting country,
all individuals unambiguously gain from trade. These ndings are however not
robust to changes in the assumptions on production technology and market struc-
ture. Within a new trade model with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic
competition, individuals with self-control problems can lose in both countries. In
contrast to the Ricardian setting, even individuals without self-control problems
can lose if the average self-control problem is stronger in their country than in the
country they start trading with.
Keywords: Globalization, welfare gains from trade, self-control problems, time-
inconsistency
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A central result in international trade theory and the most powerful argument of the
proponents of globalization is that trade liberalization creates welfare gains. In classic
trade theory, gains from trade arise from specialization in production and the exploitation
of dierences in preferences and endowments across countries. Real incomes rise and
the average consumer in each country is better o, independently of the direction of
trade. New trade theories focus on imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale
as sources of gains from trade. When trade is liberalized, rms serve a larger market
and average costs decline. Consumers benet from lower prices and a larger variety of
products.
However, in each case the gains from trade result hinges on several assumptions. One
of them, which is common to all trade models, is that individuals behave fully ratio-
nally in the sense that they would never do anything that violates their own preferences.
Yet, recent research in behavioral economics suggests that this is often an inappropri-
ate abstraction. For instance, there is by now substantial experimental and econometric
evidence that people suer from self-control problems when making economic decisions
which involve benets and costs occurring at dierent points in time.1 Striving for im-
mediate gratication, they are tempted to consume more than optimal of goods which
generate instantaneous benets but entail future costs. Such goods are also called sin
goods. Examples include cigarettes, alcohol, or fast food. Individuals plan to smoke,
drink, or eat less in order to enjoy a healthier and happier life, but when the moment of
the decision has arrived, they revise their plans and consume more cigarettes, alcohol, or
unhealthy food than they initially intended to. If trade in such goods is liberalized and
leads to an expanded choice set and lower prices, the problem of overconsumption may in
fact get worse for some consumers, and gains from trade are no longer guaranteed. When
consumers are heterogeneous in their degree of self-control, trade will also have distribu-
tional consequences, even if preferences are otherwise identical, and the advantageousness
of trade depends on whether feasible redistribution mechanisms exist.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the welfare eects of trade when consumers
lack self-control. Which factors determine who gains and who loses from trade, and how
much? Is the distribution of winners and losers within and across countries sensitive to
changes in the assumptions on production technology and market structure of the sin
good? And nally, can we nd instruments that correct for the ineciencies caused by
1Frederick et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of the respective studies. Gruber and
K oszegi (2004) also review dierent kinds of evidence on self-control problems, but with a focus on
smoking behavior.
1self-control problems and make trade a Pareto-improvement over autarky, thus saving
the gains from trade argument?
To address these questions, self-control problems are rst incorporated into a dynamic
Ricardian model of inter-industry trade with two countries and two goods. Self-control
problems are modeled as time-inconsistent preferences for immediate gratication which
apply to only one of the two goods. Individuals within a country may dier in their
degree of self-control. In this setting, the welfare consequences depend on the direction
of trade and on the price-sensitivity of consumers. Provided that they react strongly
enough to price changes, individuals in the country importing the sin good lose if their
self-control problem is suciently large, and if the traditional gains due to specialization
and exchange are only small. This is because the declining price induces individuals with
a lack of willpower to consume even more of the sin good. The loss due to inecient
overconsumption rises and overcompensates the traditional gains from trade. However,
if individuals with low self-control are hardly responsive to price changes, trade does
not aggravate their problem of overconsumption, and all consumers in the importing
country are better o compared to autarky. In case some individuals lose, the welfare
gains from trade can be redistributed by imposing a tari on the imported good such
that the price under trade equals the price in autarky and distributing the proceeds in
a lump sum fashion. This way, the gains due to specialization can be realized without
worsening the problem of overconsumption. In the exporting country, where the relative
price of the sin good increases after borders open up, all individuals unambiguously gain
from trade. Here, the rising price serves a self-control function, mitigating the problem
of overconsumption. The more price-sensitive consumers with low self-control are, the
stronger is this benecial eect, and thus the higher are their gains from trade compared
to the gains of the fully self-controlled individuals.
While the results in the Ricardian setting are essentially driven by price movements
and are rather intuitive, the integration of self-control problems into a trade model with
increasing returns to scale in production and monopolistic competition leads to surprising
conclusions. In this setting, it is no longer the case that individuals with self-control
problems gain from trade in at least one country. In fact, trade can lead to a lower price
and a larger variety of the sin good in both countries, and thus exacerbate the problem
of overconsumption for individuals with a lack of willpower on both sides of the border.
In addition, heterogeneity in the degree of self-control across countries opens up the
possibility that in one country even the fully self-controlled individuals lose from trade.
This will be the case if the average degree of self-control is larger in the open economy
than in the closed economy. All else equal, a larger average degree of self-control reduces
aggregate demand, which reduces the available product variety and thus counteracts the
2conventional, benecial eect of trade liberalization for the fully self-controlled. Hence,
production technology and market structure play a decisive role in determining who gains
and who loses from trade and need to be carefully taken into account when deriving policy
recommendations.
By introducing time-inconsistent preferences into models of trade, the present piece
of research bridges a gap between international trade theory and new insights from be-
havioral economics. Even though more realistic psychological foundations of economic
behavior have by now found acceptance and applications in macroeconomics, labor eco-
nomics, and, most notably, nance,2 they have hardly found their way into international
trade theory.3 The theoretical work most closely related to the present paper deals
with the issue of optimal taxation in case individuals have time-inconsistent preferences.
O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) also consider a model with two goods, one of which is
associated with self-control problems, and analyze whether a small tax on the sin good
improves social welfare.4 In principle, trade liberalization has the same eect like a tax on
the price of the sin good in the importing country, and thus has similar implications for in-
dividual and social welfare. Yet, the analysis in the present paper diers in several aspects
from O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006). First, I will abstract from population heterogeneity
in tastes to further simplify the analysis and concentrate on population heterogeneity in
the degree of self-control. Second, unlike O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), I cannot rest
the welfare analysis on marginal arguments, since autarky and free trade are eectively
two dierent states of the world. Yet another and maybe the most important dierence
is that the present paper adopts a general equilibrium perspective and explicitly models
the production sector and the labor market of the economy, while O'Donoghue and Rabin
(2006) assume that marginal costs and hence wages are xed and that individuals are
given an exogenously xed income. Taking the supply side of the economy into account is
essential to determine the gains from trade which arise from specialization in production
and which can potentially compensate the losses due to ineciencies on the consumption
side.5
However, analyzing the welfare eects of trade liberalization in the presence of self-
control problems is not only of theoretical interest. In the mid 1980's, the U.S. forced
2See Camerer et al. (2004), Frederick et al. (2002), and Khalil (2009) for a collection of the most
important recent contributions.
3Two noteworthy exceptions are Freund and  Ozden (2008) and Tovar (2009), who analyze the impli-
cations of loss aversion for trade policy, both theoretically and empirically.
4Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011) extend the analysis to a political economy setting in which individuals
with self-control problems vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods.
5To the extent that self-control problems are interpreted as a negative externality an individual
imposes on its future selves, the present paper also relates to the broad literature on the theory of
second-best in international trade, which started o with Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) and Bhagwati
(1971).
3four Asian countries to drastically cut their import taris on cigarettes by threatening
them with retaliatory sanctions. As a consequence, per capita cigarette consumption in
these four countries increased signicantly (Chaloupka and Laixuthai, 1996). The positive
relationship between trade liberalization in general and smoking has been identied for
other low- and middle income countries as well (Bettcher et al., 2003; Taylor et al.,
2000). The negative health eects of smoking are well documented and have induced
the public to blame free trade in cigarettes for reducing the subjective well-being of
consumers. Accepting that individuals have time-inconsistent preferences with respect to
smoking would support such a claim and provide an economic rationale for government
intervention that goes beyond negative externalities or incorrect information. In fact, I
show for the example of Taiwan that losses from trade in cigarettes due to self-control
problems are not only a theoretical possibility but do occur in practice. A similar case
has been made for unhealthy food. Amongst other factors, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (2008) holds imports of foods from industrialized countries, which are rich
in fat and sugar, responsible for changing nutrition patterns and growing obesity in
developing countries. As Stutzer (2007) shows empirically, obesity reduces the subjective
well-being of individuals who lack self-control. For them, the availability of Western style
food does more harm than good. Another example is the consumption of cultural goods.
Benesch et al. (2010) show that heavy TV viewers are worse o if a larger number of TV
channels is available, a result which is incompatible with standard economic theory, but
compatible with heavy TV viewers experiencing self-control problems. To the extent that
globalization increases the choice of TV channels, it may actually decrease the happiness
of TV viewers with time-inconsistent preferences.
In the following section, I will illustrate in more detail the case of trade in cigarettes
as one example where self-control problems might inuence the benets of free trade. In
section 3, I will present a simple way to model self-control problems as present-biased pref-
erences. These preferences will then be incorporated into a Ricardian model to analyze
the welfare consequences of trade under constant returns to scale and perfect competition
in section 4. Section 5 deals with self-control problems and the welfare consequences of
trade in a model with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Section
6 summarizes the results and concludes.
42 Self-control problems and the liberalization of trade
in cigarettes
In the past thirty years, tari and non-tari barriers to trade have been reduced in
many countries and for a variety of goods and services, including cigarettes. Tobacco
companies such as Philip Morris or British American Tobacco, facing a declining demand
in the United States and Western Europe, actively promoted the liberalization of trade in
tobacco, and seized the opportunity to target the newly opened markets in Asia, Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa.6 Consequently, world exports of cigarettes
increased from 59 billion pieces in 1960 to 322 billion pieces in 1980. In 2004, world
exports of cigarettes amounted to 749 billion pieces (Foreign Agricultural Service, 2007).
After having opened their borders to foreign cigarette imports, many countries expe-
rienced a sharp increase in per capita consumption of cigarettes. In fact, several empirical
studies have conrmed a causal relationship running from trade liberalization to cigarette
consumption. For instance, Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1996) analyze annual time series
data from 1970 to 1991 for ten Asian countries, four of which were forced to open their
markets to U.S. cigarette imports in the mid-1980's under the threat of retaliatory sanc-
tions, namely Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Their results suggest that per
capita consumption in the liberalized countries was on average ten percent higher than
it would have been if imports had remained restricted. Hsieh et al. (1999) estimate the
demand for domestic and imported cigarettes in Taiwan using 1966-1995 annual time
series data. They conclude that opening the borders to U.S. cigarette imports has had
two eects. First, consumers have switched from domestic to imported brands and sec-
ond, overall consumption of cigarettes has increased. These results are in line with Hsu
et al. (2005), who compare actual with projected trends for smoking rates in Taiwan for
the period after market opening in 1986. Based on data from consumer surveys of the
Monopoly Bureau and the National Health Interview Survey they show that in 2001, the
actual smoking rates were signicantly higher than the projected ones, both for males and
females. In addition, the data reveal that per capita consumption of cigarettes in Taiwan
increased by 30% from 1986 to 2001. Taylor et al. (2000) use a data set including 42
countries from 1970 to 1995. Estimating xed-eects models separately for low-income,
middle-income, and high-income countries with per capita cigarette consumption as the
dependent variable, they nd that trade openness has had a signicantly positive eect
on smoking in lower- and middle-income countries. Bettcher et al. (2003) proceed in
6Details on the companies' business strategies were revealed in 1998, when once secret tobacco industry
documents were made publicly available as a result of legal action. See World Health Organization (2004)
and Bettcher et al. (2003) for an overview.
5a similar fashion, but with a larger data set covering 80 countries from 1970 to 1997.
Their results are consistent with Taylor et al. (2000), indicating that trade openness has
contributed to an increase in per capita cigarette consumption in low- and middle-income
countries.
There is also more indirect evidence of the positive relationship between trade liber-
alization and cigarette consumption. In many countries, including Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, and Thailand, the tobacco industry was controlled by a government run monopoly
before trade in tobacco was liberalized. As pointed out by Chaloupka and Laixuthai
(1996), opening borders has led to increased competition and lower prices. The inverse
relationship between prices and tobacco consumption is in turn well documented, with
most estimates of the overall price elasticity ranging from -0.25 to -0.5 for high-income
countries. Low- and middle-income countries are generally more price sensitive, with
most estimates ranging from -0.5 to -1.0. Lower prices both increase smoking prevalence
and boost conditional cigarette demand. For the United States, estimates indicate that
at least half of the overall price elasticity can be attributed to smoking prevalence (see
Chaloupka and Warner (2000) and Chaloupka et al. (2000) for a survey of the respective
studies). A recent study on youth smoking behavior in low- and middle-income countries
by Kostova et al. (2010) suggests a price elasticity of smoking participation of -0.63, and
a price elasticity of conditional cigarette demand of -1.2.
Unlike other consumer goods, however, cigarettes entail enormous health costs. Nu-
merous epidemiologic studies have shown that smoking is causal for a variety of cancers
as well as for several cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.7 As pointed out by Peto
and Lopez (2001), half of lifetime smokers die prematurely. Viscusi and Hersch (2008)
estimate that the discounted expected mortality costs of smoking, measured in terms of
foregone income due to premature death, amount to 222 $ per pack for a male consumer
and 94 $ for a female consumer, assuming a 3% discount rate.
To sum up, there is strong evidence that trade liberalization has led to increased
cigarette consumption in the importing countries, and it is an established fact that such
an increase has devastating health consequences, although these occur with a delay of
several years or even decades.8 Correspondingly, Mathers and Loncar (2006) predict that
the total number of premature, tobacco-related deaths will rise from 5.4 million in 2005
to 8.3 million in 2030. Regional aggregates are not available, but Mathers and Loncar
(2006) suggest that it will decline in high-income countries, while it will double in low-
and middle income countries. Ezzati and Lopez (2004) estimate that the fraction of adult
7The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004) and the World Health Organization
(2005) provide a comprehensive overview of the scientic evidence on the health consequences of smoking.
8On the delay between the onset of smoking and the occurrence of smoking-related diseases, see
Gajalakshmi et al. (2000) and the literature cited therein.
6deaths that can be attributed to smoking was 12% in 2000, with large variations across
regions, age, and gender. Males in the industrialized countries had the highest smoking
mortality rates, which is not surprising given the long latency and the only recent cutbacks
in smoking. However, the developing countries are catching up. Wen et al. (2005) provide
estimates for Taiwan, indicating that smoking attributable male mortality will increase
from 16% in 2001 to 20% in 2020 if current smoking patterns persist.
From a traditional economic viewpoint, the negative consequences of smoking alone
do not justify any intervention. Rational consumers would foresee the future health costs
and would take them fully into account when deciding whether and how much to smoke.
They weigh the immediate benets of a cigarette against the future costs and make a
decision that maximizes their lifetime utility. Thus, apart from additional eects such as
negative externalities or incorrect information about the risks and the addictive potential
involved, there is no scope for government action.9 Free trade is the best policy. Yet,
there is substantial evidence that this is not quite true. Individuals lack self-control with
regard to smoking, and thus make sub-optimal consumption decisions.10 The traditional
gains from trade argument does no longer hold. For the case of Taiwan, taking the theory
to the data suggests that an individual with an average degree self-control may have lost
at least 0.6 % of real income.
3 Modeling self-control problems
The way of modeling self-control problems is identical for the two trade models I will
consider in the following sections. Self-control problems arise when individuals have
time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences. They overvalue the immediate benets of
a good while neglecting the future costs of its consumption and consequently consume
more than they would have judged to be optimal from a prior perspective.11 Present-
biased intertemporal preferences are characterized by discount factors which increase over
time. In a discrete time setting, this key qualitative feature can be captured by assuming
a quasi-hyperbolic discount function. Mainly because of its analytical tractability, such
a function has been widely used to model self-control problems since Laibson (1997).
Originally, it has been introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) to study intergenera-
9The rationale for intervention in the case of negative externalities and information failures and the
available policy options are discussed extensively in Jha et al. (2000).
10See, for instance, Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), Hersch (2005), and Kan (2007).
11Similarly, if something has immediate costs, but generates future benets, individuals with self-
control problems will choose too little of it, a phenomenon that is also known as procrastination. Exam-
ples are studying for exams or saving for retirement.
7tional altruism. With a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, the discounted utility of an
individual at time t is





where ut is the instantaneous utility in period t,   1, and   1. This formulation
implies a discount factor of  between the current and the next period and a discount
factor of  between two consecutive periods in the future. For  < 1, the discount factor
increases over time, and the individual revises her initial plans for future consumption
once the future has arrived. The smaller is , the larger is the individual's tendency to
overvalue immediate benets and the stronger is the self-control problem. For  = 1, the
discount factor is constant, and we are back to a setting with time-consistent preferences.
Similar to O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), I assume an instantaneous utility function
of the form
ut  v(xt)   c(xt 1) + zt (2)
where xt denotes consumption at period t of the good associated with self-control prob-
lems and c(xt 1) describes the negative consequences of consumption that occurred one
period ago. Good x may be a homogeneous good, as in the Ricardian model, or a
dierentiated good, as in the increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition
setting. Utility is quasilinear in zt, which denotes consumption at period t of a composite
good that is not subject to self-control problems and serves as a num eraire. Marginal ben-
ets are assumed to be positive and decreasing, i.e. vx > 0 and vxx < 0. Marginal costs
are also assumed to be positive, cx > 0, but might be increasing, constant, or decreasing,
i.e. cxx > 0, cxx = 0, or cxx < 0, with the additional restriction that vxx   cxx < 0 to
ensure that consumption is well-behaved.
In contrast to O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), who allow for marginal utilities and
marginal costs to dier across individuals, I abstract from heterogeneity in tastes, since
this alone would make trade more benecial for some persons than for others. Here, I want
to focus on the role of diering degrees of self-control for the distributional consequences
of trade and thus allow for heterogeneity in the self-control parameter  only. The
traditional discount factor  is assumed to be identical for all individuals, and is set to 1
for simplicity.
With the instantaneous utility function given in (2) and  = 1, the discounted utility
at time t of an individual with self-control parameter  can be written as
Ut = v(xt)   c(xt 1) + zt +  (v(xt+1)   c(xt) + zt+1 + ::: + v(xT)   c(xT 1) + zT): (3)
8In period t, the individual chooses a consumption allocation for the current period, xt
and zt, and makes a plan of consumption allocations for all future periods, xt+1, zt+1,
..., xT, zT to maximize (3) subject to a budget constraint for each period t, t + 1, ...,
T. I assume that in each period an individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically
and is paid the equilibrium wage. Borrowings and savings are ruled out, such that in
each period total labor income is spent on consumption. Given the additively separable
structure of preferences and the absence of borrowings and savings, the consumption
decisions of dierent periods are independent. Hence, in period t, the individual chooses
xt and zt to maximize v(xt)   c(xt) + zt subject to the period t budget constraint,
ptxt+zt = wt. Moreover, she plans to consume xt+1 and zt+1 in period t+1 to maximize
 (v(xt+1)   c(xt+1) + zt+1) or, equivalently, v(xt+1) c(xt+1)+zt+1 subject to the period
t + 1 budget constraint, pt+1xt+1 + zt+1 = wt+1. However, once period t + 1 has arrived,
the discounted utility function is Ut+1. The individual revises the plans she has made
one period ago and now chooses xt+1 and zt+1 to maximize v(xt+1)   c(xt+1) + zt+1
subject to the period t + 1 budget constraint. Future costs of consumption weigh less
heavily than they did one period ago. In principle, unless wages and prices change over
time, an individual solves the same optimization problem in each period, and I will omit
the time subscript for notational convenience. In each period, the individual chooses
current consumption, maximizing v(x)   c(x) + z  u(x;z), and makes a plan for
future consumption, maximizing v(x)   c(x) + z  u(x;z), which will be revised one
period later.
Given that the preferences of an individual with self-control problems change over
time, dening an appropriate welfare criterion is inherently problematic. A common
approach in the literature is to evaluate actual choices according to the individual's long-
run preferences.12 These preferences reect the consumption plan the individual would
like to commit to in advance if this was possible. I will follow this approach and measure
an individual's welfare by u(x;z). According to Kahneman (1994), one may interpret
u(x;z) as \decision utility", which governs an individual's consumption choices, and
u(x;z) as \experienced utility", which reects the subjective well-being the individual
derives from these choices. For an individual with time-inconsistent preferences, decision
utility and experienced utility diverge, implying that the individual makes consumption
choices which are not in her best interest, in the sense that they do not give her the
highest possible level of happiness and satisfaction.
In the following section, I will focus on interior solutions to the optimization problem.
If (x;z) is the actual choice maximizing u(x;z), this implies that vx(x) cx(x) p =
12See for example O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), or Gruber and
K oszegi (2004). For a discussion of alternative welfare criteria, see Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2004).
90 and z = w px. Similarly, if (x;z) is the ideal choice maximizing u(x;z), it must
be that vx(x) cx(x) p = 0 and z = w px. From the rst order conditions, one
can immediately replicate three basic results of O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006). First, for
all p and all  < 1, x > x, meaning that people with self-control problems consume
more than optimal of the good with immediate benets and future costs. Second, actual
consumption increases as the self-control problem gets worse, dx=d =  cx(x)=  
(vxx(x)   cxx(x)) < 0. And third, actual consumption increases as the price declines,
dx=dp =  1=   (vxx(x)   cxx(x)) < 0.
4 Ricardian model
I will now incorporate these time-inconsistent preferences into a classic Ricardian two
countries, two goods model of international trade. To analyze the welfare eects of trade,
I will compare the autarky and the trade equilibrium for consumers with dierent degrees
of self-control in both countries. An example will help to illustrate the results.
4.1 Model description
For concreteness, I name the two countries Home and Foreign, and index all variables and
parameters by H and F, respectively. I assume that in each period, there is a continuum
of individuals with mass LH in Home and LF in Foreign. Each individual maximizes
her decision utility u(x;z) with respect to x and z as described in the previous section.
Individuals within each country dier with respect to their degree of self-control, as
described by the cumulative distribution functions H() and F(). Given that each
individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically, total labor supply in each period is








with i = x;z (4)
where QiH is the output of good i in country H, LiH is the total amount of labor used in
sector i in country H, and aiH are the units of labor needed to produce one unit of good
i in country H. Labor is mobile intersectorally, but not internationally, and goods and
factor markets are perfectly competitive.
104.2 Autarky and trade equilibrium
Since individual decisions at dierent points in time are independent of one another, and
production technologies as well as labor supply do not change over time, the equilibrium
allocations and prices will be identical for each period in autarky and for each period
under trade, respectively. An autarky equilibrium in Home for any period consists of
inputs (LxH;LzH), outputs (QxH;QzH), a consumption tuple (x;z) for each individual,
and prices (pH;wH) such that (i) individual consumption choices are feasible and maxi-
mize u(x;z), given prices, (ii) rms' input and output choices are feasible and maximize
prots, given prices, (iii) labor markets clear, LxH + LzH = LH, and (iv) goods mar-
kets clear, LH
R
x(pH;wH;)dH() = QxH and LH
R
z(pH;wH;)dH() = QzH. The
analogous denition applies to Foreign.
A trade equilibrium for any period are inputs, outputs, consumption tuples in both
countries, and prices (p;wH;wF) such that (i) to (iii) continue to hold in each country, (iv')









z(p;wF;)dF() = QzH + QzF, and (v) trade is bal-
anced. These equilibrium denitions are those of a classic Ricardian model, with the
exception that individuals are heterogeneous in the preferences governing their consump-
tion behavior.
Due to the intersectoral mobility of labor, wages are equalized across sectors within
each country. When both goods are produced and consumed in each country in the au-
tarky equilibrium, perfect competition requires that prices equal marginal costs in both
sectors in Home and Foreign. With the price of good z being normalized to 1 and pA
H and
pA
F denoting the autarky equilibrium prices of good x in Home and Foreign, this implies
pA
H = axH=azH and pA
F = axF=azF. Hence, autarky equilibrium prices are solely deter-
mined by production technologies. I assume that Foreign has a comparative advantage
in producing good x, meaning that axH=azH > axF=azF. Under this assumption, the
relative price of the good associated with self-control problems is higher in Home than
in Foreign in the autarky equilibrium. When borders open up, the relative price of good
x in the trade equilibrium, pT, is bounded by the two autarky prices, pA
F  pT  pA
H.13
However, trade only has an eect on welfare if the relative price changes. Therefore, I will
concentrate on the more interesting case where pA
F < pT < pA
H. In this case, each country
13Recall that individual and thus aggregate demand for good x is decreasing in p. For pT < pA
F,
production of good x would fall to zero in both countries while demand would increase relative to the
autarky equilibrium, resulting in excess demand. Similarly, for pT > pA
H, production of good x would
rise while demand would decrease, resulting in excess supply.
11fully specializes in the production of the good in which it has a comparative advantage
and the world supply of good x is LF=axF, while the world supply of good z is LH=azH.14
4.3 Welfare eects of trade liberalization
Given that consumption and production decisions in dierent periods are independent
of one another, it is irrelevant in which period trade is liberalized to decide whether an
individual benets from opening up borders. One can simply compare her experienced
utility for trade equilibrium choices with her experienced utility for autarky equilibrium
choices. The dierence may then be interpreted as the per period gain from trade mea-







































H ) denoting the individual's decision utility maximizing choice in the trade
equilibrium and (xA
H ;zA
H ) denoting her decision utility maximizing choice in the autarky
equilibrium. Since pT < pA
H and x is decreasing in p, xT
H > xA
H . The rst part of
equation (6) reects the traditional gains from trade, which would arise if the consumer
had time-consistent preferences and her experienced utility coincided with her decision
utility. These gains are unambiguously positive as can be shown with standard revealed
preference arguments. The second part of equation (6) only applies if the individual has
time-inconsistent preferences and  < 1. It reects the fact that the individual does not
fully take into account the increase in costs when consuming more of good x in response
to the price decline. The resulting ineciency reduces the traditional gains from trade,
and total gains from trade may become negative.
The gains from trade for an individual in Foreign can be obtained by replacing H by
F in equations (5) and (6). As for an individual in Home, they can be divided into a
traditional part and a component that is due to the self-control problem. The traditional
part is again positive. In contrast to the Home country, however, the second component
is negative. This is because the relative price of the good associated with self-control
problems rises in Foreign compared to autarky, pT > pA
F, and consumption declines,
xT
F < xA
F . Trade eectively mitigates the self-control problem by reducing the costs that
cause inecient consumption since they are not fully taken into account. Thus, the total
14Complete spezialization occurs whenever a country is neither too small nor too large relative to the
world demand for the good in which it has a comparative advantage.
12gains from trade for any individual in Foreign are unambiguously positive, no matter
whether the individual suers from self-control problems or not.
Summing up, if there exists an autarky equilibrium and a trade equilibrium in which
Home specializes in the production of good z and Foreign specializes in the production of
good x, and if each individual consumes both goods x and z in autarky and under trade,
which I will assume throughout, then the following is true:
Proposition 1
1. If the individual lives in Home, she gains from trade for  = 1 and may gain or
lose from trade for  < 1.
2. If the individual lives in Foreign, she gains from trade for all   1.
When are consumers in Home more likely to lose from trade? Some comparative
static helps to answer this question. First, an important determinant of the benets from
trade liberalization is the degree of self-control. Yet, a larger self-control problem does
not necessarily imply that an individual is more likely to lose. The derivative
@GH
@
















suggests that it depends on how strongly individuals with dierent degrees of self-control
react to the price reduction from pA
H to pT. If consumers with low self-control are more
price responsive than those with high self-control, their problem of overconsumption gets
worse more than it does for those with high self-control, and they experience a smaller
gain or a larger loss in utility, respectively. Consumers with lower self-control are more
price responsive if the following assumption is satised:
Assumption 1 For all x, 2cxx(vxx   cxx) < cx(vxxx   cxxx).
It is sucient for cx(x)@x=@ to be decreasing in x and thus for the gains from trade
in Home to be increasing in . Assumption 1 is satised for most commonly used utility
functions when costs are linear or quadratic, e.g. for log utility and linear costs.15
Analogously, if individuals in Foreign with low self-control are more price responsive
than those with high self-control, they benet more from the price increase from pA
F to pT,
as they reduce their overconsumption more than those with high self-control do. There-
fore, assumption 1 is also sucient for the gains from trade in Foreign to be decreasing
in .
15Assumption 1 is not satised e.g. for quadratic utility and linear costs, v(x) =  b(x a)2 with b > 0,
a > 0 and c(x) = cx. In this case, demand functions for good x are linear, and the slope is independent
of . Hence, as the price of good x falls, individuals with low self control consume more to the same
extent as individuals with high self-control do and thus make the same gains from trade.
13Proposition 2 If assumption 1 is satised, @GH=@ > 0 and @GF=@ < 0, that is in
Home individuals with higher self-control gain more from trade, while in Foreign individ-
uals with lower self-control gain more from trade.
In the optimal taxation framework of O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), the same as-
sumption is sucient for small taxes on good x to create Pareto-improvements if the
tax proceeds are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion and individuals dier only with
respect to . This is not surprising, given that in a Ricardian setting a tax and trade
liberalization have the same eect in the Home country: they both change the relative
price p, albeit in opposite directions. When a small tax is levied and individuals with
self-control problems are suciently price responsive, the price hike helps them to reduce
their overconsumption, and this eect outweighs their loss in real income. When trade
is liberalized and individuals with self-control problems are suciently price responsive,
the decline in price exacerbates their overconsumption, thus reducing their gains in real
income. If all individuals were forced to bear an equal share of the hypothetical costs that
would arise if the government wanted to guarantee trade prices in an autarky situation
by subsidizing good x, then everybody in Home would be weakly worse o under free
trade. However, these costs do not have to be borne under free trade, and thus at least
those individuals with  = 1 are better o.
Whether and by how much an individual benets from trade also depends on the ex-
tent to which the trade price diers from the autarky price. The trade price is determined
through supply and demand in general equilibrium, and thus depends on population size,
technology, and the distribution of preferences. With G() denoting the world distribu-
tion of  and pT denoting the corresponding trade price, one gets the following result:
Lemma 1
1. The equilibrium price pT is decreasing in LF and increasing in LH and axF.
2. For any two distribution functions G0() and G() with G0()  G() for all ,
pT0  pT.
An increase of the population in Foreign which leaves the distribution F() unaected
decreases the equilibrium price, because it increases aggregate supply more than aggregate
demand. An increase of the population in Home, however, only increases aggregate
demand, and thus leads to a higher equilibrium price. Furthermore, as axF increases,
production of good x gets less ecient and the equilibrium price rises, all other things





x(pT;)dF() = LF=axF. Note that the demand
for good x is independent of income for an interior solution because of the quasilinear
14structure of preferences. Using that the world distribution of  is the weighted sum of the
distributions in Home and Foreign, G() = (LHH() + LFF())=(LH + LF), the goods
market clearing condition can be rewritten as (LH + LF)
R
x(pT;)dG() = LF=axF.
When the distribution changes from G() to G0() such that more people have less self-
control, aggregate demand increases, and ceteris paribus the equilibrium price must rise.
Knowing how the equilibrium price pT depends on the parameters of the model, the
next step is to analyze how it aects the individual gains from trade.
Proposition 3
1. If the individual lives in Home and has  = 1, her gains are decreasing in pT. If
she has  < 1, her gains are decreasing in pT if and only if  xT




2. If the individual lives in Foreign, her gains are increasing in pT for all   1.
In Home, a smaller equilibrium price pT has two eects. It increases the traditional gains
from trade as the imported good becomes cheaper, but it also worsens the ineciency
due to overconsumption for those individuals who suer from self-control problems, as
can be seen from the derivative @GH=@pT =  xT
H  (1 )cx@xT
F =@pT. For an individual
with  < 1, both eects work into opposite directions, and the gains from trade are only
decreasing in pT if the traditional eect dominates the overconsumption eect. Overall,
the relationship between GH and pT does not need to be monotonic. Like in the example
in section 4.4, it may happen that the gains from trade for an individual with self-
control problems rst rise as pT falls, and then decline as pT moves further away from
the autarky price. For an individual with  = 1, the overconsumption eect vanishes and
@GH=@pT =  xT
H < 0.







F =@pT. A larger equilibrium price pT increases
the traditional gains from trade as the exported good becomes more expensive,16 and
it reduces the ineciency due to overconsumption. Thus, the gains from trade unam-
biguously rise with pT for all individuals in Foreign.
One may not only be interested in the individual gains from trade, but also in the gains
from trade for a country as a whole. However, without assuming a specic utility and cost
function and a particular distribution of , it is dicult to make any statement about
the sign and the size of a country's gains from trade, at least for Home. Clearly, if all




F = pT=axF   pTxT




, using that marginal costs
must equal the price in equilibrium, wT
FaxF = pT. Hence, in a trade equilibrium where individual
consumption of z is positive and the individual welfare analysis in this chapter applies, it must be that
1=axF   xT
F > 0.
15Taking this as a starting point, one can think about what happens if more and more
individuals in Home suer from self-control problems. This has two eects: First, the
equilibrium price pT rises, and second, the gains of individuals with lower  weigh more
heavily. A rising price unambiguously hurts those who are still fully self-controlled, and
given that individuals with self-control problems can never make higher gains than those
who are fully self-controlled as long as assumption 1 is satised, the country's gains from
trade cannot rise as one moves from a situation with no self-control problems to a situation
where at least some individuals in Home have self-control problems. Yet, comparing two
dierent distributions of self-control problems in Home is impossible without further
information due to the fact that individuals with low self-control may actually benet
from a rising price. The Foreign country's gains from trade are always positive, and if
assumption 1 is satised, they are the higher the more individuals in Foreign suer from
self-control problems.
However, even if the Home country's gains from trade are negative, trade can be
made a Pareto-improvement. The government in Home just has to introduce a tari on
the imported good x such that the consumer price under trade equals the autarky price,
and redistribute the tari revenue in a lump sum fashion. In this case, the traditional
gains due to specialization are preserved, and losses due to increased overconsumption
are avoided. Thus, Pareto-gains from trade are possible, but they require government
action. Also note that a tari on the sin good will reduce the equilibrium price in Foreign,
thereby reducing the gains that can be achieved abroad.
To illustrate the results derived in this section and to give an idea of how large the
gains or losses due to trade liberalization may in fact be, I will provide an example with a
concrete utility and cost function and feasible parameter values in the following section.
4.4 Example
Suppose v(x) = 2
p
x and c(x) = x for all individuals in Home and Foreign. Then the
interior solution to the decision utility maximization problem is x = 1=( + p)2 and
z = w p=( +p)2. Using the equilibrium prices and wages in autarky and under trade,
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16The rst part of each equation reects the traditional gains, which are unambiguously
positive if each country fully specializes in its comparative advantage good and the in-
dividual consumes both goods x and z in autarky and under trade. The second part
describes the change in welfare due to a change in overconsumption, which is negative
in Home and positive in Foreign. Thus, in Foreign, all individuals unambiguously gain
from trade, while in Home, individuals with self-control problems may lose from trade
if the traditional gains are overcompensated by the welfare loss due to increased over-
consumption. Whether this will actually happen depends on the individual's self-control
parameter  and on the equilibrium price pT, which solves the goods market clearing
condition and depends on the distribution of  in Home and in Foreign, the population
sizes LH and LF and the technology parameter axF.
I assume that the self-control parameter  is uniformly distributed on the interval
[0:4;1] in Home and in Foreign. Empirical evidence on the distribution of the self-control
parameter  is still limited. Most studies that estimate models with hyperbolic discount-
ing estimate a single  for the whole sample. For instance, Laibson et al. (2007) use a
consumption-savings model and estimate a  of about 0:7. Shui and Ausubel (2005) take
the results of an experiment in the credit-card market and estimate a present-bias factor
of 0:8, while Fang and Silverman (2009) implement a model of labor supply and welfare
participation and get an estimate for  of about 0:34. An exception is Paserman (2008),
who estimates the degree of hyperbolic discounting in a job search model for dierent
groups of workers. His estimate for  is 0:4 for low income workers (1st quartile of the
wage distribution), 0:48 for medium income workers (2nd and 3rd quartile of the wage
distribution), and 0:89 for high income workers (4th quartile of the wage distribution).
To sum up, even though most studies cannot reject the hypothesis that individuals are
hyperbolic discounters, the estimates vary considerably depending on the model used and
the assumptions made, and information about the distribution of  that go beyond its
mean are scarce. Therefore, a uniform distribution of  on [0:4;1] with mean 0.7 does
not seem to be implausible.
The remaining parameter values have to be chosen such that (i) Foreign has a compar-
ative advantage in good x, (ii) the equilibrium price lies between the two autarky prices
pA
F and pA
H, and (iii) each individual with  2 [0:4;1] in Home and Foreign has strictly
positive demand for x and z in autarky and under trade. One set of parameter values
that satises conditions (i) to (iii) is LH = 6, axH = 0:3, azH = 0:4, LF = 1, axF = 0:2
and azF = 0:4.
For these parameter values, the gains from trade in Home and Foreign for individuals
with dierent degrees of self-control are displayed in gure 1. To ease interpretation, they
are indicated in percent of the individual's experienced utility in autarky. A fully self-
17β
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Figure 1: Individual gains in Home and Foreign
controlled individual in Home gains about 2:8% from trade. In other words, free trade
allows an individual with  = 1 to increase consumption of the composite good by about
2:8%, all else being equal. The welfare gains are the lower, the stronger is the self-control
problem: an individual with  = 0:6 gains only about 1:6% from trade. For an individual
with  =  = 0:46, the loss due to increased overconsumption and the traditional
gains exactly compensate, and an individual at the lower end of the distribution loses by
more than 1:2%. Given that the chosen utility function satises assumption 1, it is not
surprising that the individual gains from trade in Home are increasing in . In Foreign,
the individual gains from trade are positive and decreasing in  for all  2 [0:4;1]. A
fully self-controlled individual can consume about 3% more of the composite good under
trade than in autarky, while an individual at the lower end of the distribution gains more
than 3:8% from trade.
In addition to the self-control parameter , the equilibrium price under trade is crucial
for an individual's gains from trade. While the gains from trade are decreasing in pT for a
fully self-controlled individual in Home, the relationship is non-monotonic for individuals
with low self-control. Their gains, measured in percent of autarky experienced utility,
increase if the equilibrium price under trade falls only slightly below the autarky price in
Home, but decrease and eventually become negative if pT declines further, which happens,
for instance, if the population in Foreign grows.17
17For the given parameter values with LF = 1, the equilibrium price is pT = 0:52, and at this price
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Figure 2: Individual gains in Home for dierent  as a function of pT.
Finally, with a uniform distribution of the self-control parameter , the gains from
trade for a country as a whole are proportional to the area under the respective curve in
gure 1. In this specic example, they are positive in both Home and Foreign.
5 New trade model
I will now turn to a new trade model, characterized by increasing returns to scale and
monopolistic competition, and show that in such a framework the welfare implications
of trade may dier from those in a Ricardian model. First, individuals in both countries
may lose from trade, and second, even fully self-controlled individuals may lose if there
is heterogeneity in the degree of self-control across countries.
5.1 Model description
Individuals have time-inconsistent preferences for two goods as described in section 3, with
the exception that good x is now a dierentiated good with a continuum of varieties. I
denote consumption of variety i by x(i), with i 2 [0;N]. N is the mass of varieties and is
determined endogenously. As before, I denote consumption of the composite num eraire
good by z. In each period, an individual supplies l units of labor inelastically and gets a
labor income of wl. Hence, in each period, an individual chooses x(i), i 2 [0;N], and z
to maximize her decision utility u(x(i);i 2 [0;N];z) = v(x(i);i 2 [0;N])   c(x(i);i 2
[0;N])+z subject to the budget constraint
R N
0 p(i)x(i)di+z = wl. Her welfare is measured
19in terms of experienced utility, u(x(i);i 2 [0;N];z) = v(x(i);i 2 [0;N])   c(x(i);i 2
[0;N]) + z.
To make the model analytically tractable, I assume a specic functional form for v()
and for c(), i.e.
u



























with  > 0 and  >  > 0. Similar functional forms for v() have been used for example
by Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The parameter  reects
the intensity of preferences for the dierentiated good relative to the composite good,
while  >  implies that the individual likes to spread consumption of good x over as
many varieties as possible. This love of variety is the greater, the higher is . For a
given value of ,  describes the substitutability between varieties. They are the closer
substitutes, the higher is . For the future costs of consumption, only the total amount
of the dierentiated good matters. It is irrelevant how this amount is split between the
dierent varieties. To give an intuition for this assumption, note that for the probability of
getting lung cancer, it certainly matters how much an individual smokes. It seems however
secondary whether she smokes Marlboro, Camel or Lucky Strike cigarettes. Similarly,
whether an individual becomes obese and suers from diabetes might depend on how
many bars of chocolate she eats per day. Whether this is milk chocolate or white chocolate
is however less important.
I assume that labor supply and thus income are suciently large and that the pref-
erence for the dierentiated good is suciently strong, such that all individuals have
positive demand for each variety i 2 [0;N] and for the composite good.18 In this case,












with  p = 1
N
R N
0 p(i)di being the average price of the dierentiated good.
For the moment, I focus on a single country and assume that it is populated by a
continuum of individuals with mass L. These individuals may dier in their degree of
18Assumption 2 imposes restrictions on the parameters of the model which ensure that this will indeed
be the case in equilibrium.
20self-control, as described by the cumulative distribution function H(). If all individuals
in the support of H() have a positive demand as given by equation (11), the aggregate
demand for each variety i 2 [0;N] is
X(i) = L











where   =
R
dH() is the average  in the population.
As in the previous section, the num eraire good z is produced with constant returns
to scale under perfectly competitive conditions. The units of good z are normalized such
that producing one unit of good z requires one unit of labor. This implies an equilibrium
wage of w = 1. Each variety i 2 [0;N] of the dierentiated good is produced by a single
rm with zero marginal costs and xed costs F. The rm chooses p(i) to maximize
prots, (i) = p(i)X(i)   F, taking the average price  p of the dierentiated good and
the number of rms N as given. This is a central feature of monopolistic competition:
since there is a continuum of competitors, each rm has a negligible eect on the market,
and there is no direct strategic interaction. There is only indirect interaction through
the average price  p, which inuences the aggregate demand for the dierentiated good
and thus for each variety. Another central feature of monopolistic competition, which is
assumed in the following, is free entry and exit of rms.
5.2 Autarky equilibrium
The denition of an autarky equilibrium is analogue to the one given in section 4.2, with
the exception that inputs, outputs and consumption allocations as well as prices are now
dened for each variety i 2 [0;N] of the dierentiated good. Also, the market clearing
condition must hold for each variety i 2 [0;N]. Like prices, N is taken as given by
individuals and rms and will be determined endogenously in equilibrium as rms can
freely enter and exit the market.
Since the dierent varieties enter symmetrically into the utility function (10) and
rms have identical marginal costs of zero, each rms chooses the same prot maximizing
price, which depends on the number of competitors as well as on the average price for
the dierentiated good,
p(i) =
(    ) + N p
2( + N)
for all i 2 [0;N]: (13)
Intuitively, if N increases, competition becomes ercer, and the rm must lower its price.
If  p rises, substitutes become more expensive, and the rm can charge a higher price
21for its own product. This eect is the stronger, the closer are the substitutes. Due to
symmetry,  p = p(i) = p and (13) collapses to
p =
(    )
2 + N
: (14)
Aggregate demand for each variety at the prot maximizing price then is
X = L
    
2 + N
: (15)
With free entry, rms must make zero prots in equilibrium,  = pX   F = 0. Substi-
tuting in (14) and (15) and solving for N gives
N
 =






The equilibrium mass of varieties increases if the intensity of preferences for the dieren-
tiated good rises, if the average degree of self-control decreases, or if the population size
increases. All this might be interpreted as an increase in market size. Increasing xed
costs however reduce the equilibrium mass of varieties. If they get too large relative to
market size, N will be zero in equilibrium. Plugging (16) back into (14) and (15) gives the













Note that both the equilibrium price and aggregate consumption of each variety are
independent of the average degree of self-control,  . They only depend on xed costs
F, the parameter , and the population size L. Individual consumption of each variety
will be a fraction L of aggregate consumption, corrected by a factor that accounts for



















22In equilibrium, an individual who has higher self-control than the average consumes less
of the sin good than the average, and vice versa. To ensure that all demands as well as the
equilibrium mass of varieties are positive and equations (16) to (19) indeed characterize
an autarky equilibrium, I make the following assumption:













The rst condition ensures that x > 019 and z = l Npx > 0. The second parameter
restriction guarantees that the equilibrium mass of varieties is positive. All conditions can
be satised if the xed costs are suciently small relative to the intensity of preferences
for the dierentiated good and if the individual labor supply is suciently large.
The experienced utility in the autarky equilibrium, which depends on the individual














loss due to overconsumption
: (20)
Similar to the Ricardian setting, it can be split into two parts, a traditional one and one
which reects the reduction of well-being due to overconsumption and cancels for  = 1.
5.3 Welfare eects of trade liberalization
How to think about trade liberalization within this framework? The traditional way
is to look at two economies with identical preferences and production technologies and
interpret trade simply as an increase in the mass of consumers L that can be reached
by each rm. As borders open up, producers in both countries can serve the domestic
and the foreign market and take advantage of economies of scale in production. The
equilibrium price falls. At the same time, individuals in both countries gain access to more
varieties. Even though they consume less of a single variety, their overall consumption
of the dierentiated good increases. Both the decreasing price and the increasing choice
benet the fully self-controlled individuals. The traditional part of the experienced utility
is decreasing in p and increasing in Nx. Those individuals who suer from self-control
19Hence, it is assumed that even though consumption of the dierentiated good entails future costs,
every individual consumes a tiny little bit of it. This simplies the analysis considerably without changing
the main insights.
23problems may however be worse o in both countries, since they do not correctly take
into account the increasing costs of consuming more of the dierentiated good, and their
loss due to increased overconsumption may overcompensate their conventional gains from
trade.
Within the present framework, however, trade does not only have an impact on the
size of the market that is served by each rm. Given that already individuals within one
country are heterogeneous in their degree of self-control, it is very likely that the two
trading countries are characterized by dierent cumulative distribution functions. And
unless both cumulative distribution functions have the same mean, the average degree
of self-control in the open economy  T will be dierent from the average degrees of self-
control in the two closed economies. If the average self-control problem is more severe
in Foreign than in Home, that is  F <  , then  T will be smaller than  . A smaller
average degree of self-control has a positive eect on aggregate demand, all else equal.
As a result, more varieties become available, and the total amount of the dierentiated
good an individual in Home consumes increases. The eect of a decrease in the average
degree of self-control thus goes into the same direction as the eect of an increase in
market size. It benets the fully self-controlled individuals in Home, while it may hurt
individuals with low self-control. However, if the average self-control problem is less
severe in Foreign than in Home, that is  F >  , then  T will be larger than  , and
considered in isolation, this hurts the fully self-controlled individuals in Home, while it
may benet those individuals that lack willpower. In combination with an increase in
the mass of consumers, the welfare consequences of trade are much more ambiguous and
depend on which of the two opposing eects dominates. Nevertheless, if  T is smaller
than or equal to  , one can nd a sucient condition for the individual gains from trade
in Home to be positive.
Proposition 4 Consider an individual with self-control parameter  living in a country
in which the average degree of self-control is  . Suppose assumption 2 is satised in
autarky. If the country starts trading with another country in which the average degree
self-control is equal to or lower than  , the individual gains from trade if   2   (   q
F
L )=.
For a proof, see the appendix. Thus, individuals with suciently strong self-control
gain from trade, provided that the average degree of self-control is not higher in the
country they start trading with than in their own country. Their gains increase with
the size of the population in the foreign country. What the nding also suggests is that
individuals with low self-control can lose from trade, and for this to happen, it is irrelevant
in which of the two trading countries they live in if both countries are characterized by
24similar distributions of self-control. In other words, with increasing returns to scale and
monopolistic competition, individuals with low self-control may lose from trade in both
countries, in contrast to the Ricardian setting, where at most individuals with low self-
control in the importing country can be worse o as borders open up.
Another novelty compared to the Ricardian setting is that a changing average degree
of self-control opens up the possibility that in at most one country even the fully self-
controlled individuals lose from trade. The intuition behind this result is that if a country
opens up its borders to a country in which the average degree of self-control is very high
and hence demand for the sin good is rather low, rms have to reduce their prices con-
siderably to capture these new consumers. Since rms cannot price discriminate across
countries, their revenues fall despite a larger market size. This eect leads to less rms
and hence less varieties in the trade equilibrium, which hurts the fully self-controlled indi-
viduals.20 However, numerical simulations indicate that the conditions for this to actually
happen are rather restrictive. In fact, the fully self-controlled individuals in Home can
only lose if the average degree of self-control in Foreign exceeds one, implying that the
individuals in Foreign are overly self-controlled and rather have a problem of undercon-
sumption than one of overconsumption, possibly not consuming the dierentiated good
at all in autarky. Just to give an example,  = 15,  = 10,   = 0:75, L = 15,  = 10,
 = 20, F = 10, and l = 2 is a set of parameter values that satises assumption 2. If in
Foreign the average degree of self-control is  F = 1:2 and the population size is LF = 10,
then the average degree of self-control in the open economy is  T = 0:93, and the total
population is LT = 25, implying that assumption 2 continues to hold under trade. For
these parameter values, a fully self-controlled individual in Home loses about 0.06% from
trade in terms of experienced utility, or, to put it dierently, in terms of consumption
of the num eraire good. Hence, even if the parameter values are such that losses indeed
occur, they are quantitatively negligible, in particular if the expenditure on the dieren-
tiated good represents only a small fraction of income, that is if l is large. If the average
degree of self-control is smaller than or equal to one in both Home and Foreign, the fully
self-controlled individuals on both sides of the border always gain from trade. Given the
empirical evidence on the distribution of self-control problems summarized in section 4.4,
this seems to be the more probable scenario.
20Note that the negative eect of trade liberalization on the number of varieties is not specic to a
situation in which there is heterogeneity across countries in the degree of self-control, but may occur
more generally whenever there is heterogeneity across countries in the preferences for the dierentiated
good, as captured by , or in the future costs of consumption, as reected by . Opening up borders
to a country in which the average preference for the dierentiated good is relatively low or the average
future cost of consumption is comparatively high can also lead to less rms and less varieties, and hence
make individuals in the country with high demand for the dierentiated good worse o.
255.4 Quantifying the welfare eects of trade in cigarettes
An example that motivated the analysis of the welfare eects of trade in the presence of
self-control problems was the liberalization of trade in cigarettes. One of the countries
which were forced to open their markets to foreign cigarette imports was Taiwan. Until
1986, the market for cigarettes in Taiwan was protected by high import taris and re-
strictive quotas, and the share of imported cigarettes in total consumption was less than
2%. When Taiwan liberalized the imports of cigarettes from the U.S. in 1987, the price
of imported cigarettes declined substantially and the share of imported cigarettes in total
consumption rose to 18%. Detailed time series data on cigarette consumption and prices
as used by Hsieh et al. (1999) allows to quantitatively asses the welfare implications of
this movement towards free trade.21
To this end, I compute experienced utility as given in equation (20) for an average
individual in Taiwan in 1986 and 1987. The dierence may then be interpreted as the
gain in real income due to the liberalization of trade in cigarettes. Total consumption
Nx is the number of packs sold per individual. It was 114 in 1986 and 124 in 1987.
The price p is calculated as the average price of domestic and imported brands, weighted
with their respective market shares in 1987.22 The average price was 30 in 1986 and 28.4
in 1987. Per capita income l also originates from Hsieh et al. (1999). It was 157.624 in
1986 and I assume it to be constant until 1987 to abstract from welfare gains induced
by economic growth, for instance. Income and prices are measured in New Taiwanese
Dollars and deated to 1991 values. The individual degree of self-control  is set to the
population average   = 0:7 as estimated by Laibson et al. (2007). Estimates for the
health costs of cigarette consumption  range from 20 $ (Sloan et al., 2004) to 222 $
(Viscusi and Hersch, 2008) per pack. Converting and deating these values to 1991 New
Taiwanese Dollars suggests that  is in the range of 400 to 4000. Finally, the parameter
 can be inferred from the price elasticity of cigarette consumption.23 Estimates for the
price elasticity of demand range from -0.5 to -1.2. I take an intermediate value of  = 0:8,
evaluated at a price of 29.2.24
With this parameterization I nd that even for moderate health costs of smoking,
an individual with average self-control in Taiwan lost from the liberalization of trade in
21I am deeply indebted to Chee-Ruey Hsieh, Teh-Wei Hu, and Chien-Fu Je Lin for providing me with
their data.
22Alternatively, I could weigh prices with market shares in 1986. In this case, the average price would
not fall as much after trade liberalization, and the traditional gains from trade would be even smaller.
23With symmetric varieties, total cigarette consumption can be calculated as Nx = N(     
 p)=( + N). Then the price elasticity of total cigarette consumption with respect to the average price
is Nx; p =   p=(       p), and hence  =   p(   1)= + .
24Given this data on consumption, prices, and income, and given the actual population size L of
Taiwan, I can nd reasonable parameter values for , , and F such that assumption 2 is satised and
equation (20) indeed characterizes experienced utility in the autarky and trade equilibrium, respectively.
26cigarettes. For  = 400, the loss would amount to 0.6 % of real income. For  = 2000, the
loss would already amount to 6.3 % of real income, and for  = 4000, the loss would even
exceed 50 % of real income. From this I conclude that losses from trade in the presence
of self-control problems are not only a theoretical possibility but do occur in practice.
6 Conclusion
The present paper has analyzed the consequences of time-inconsistent preferences for
the welfare eects of trade liberalization within two dierent trade models. In a classic
Ricardian model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition, it crucially
depends on the direction of trade whether an individual is better or worse o as borders
open up. In the exporting country, all individuals are better o, and they are the better
o, the higher is the equilibrium price of the sin good and the lower is their degree of
self-control. In the importing country however, while the fully self-controlled individuals
gain from trade, those individuals with self-control problems may lose from trade, and
this is the more likely, the stronger is their self-control problem, provided that they are
suciently price-sensitive.
These ndings may seem rather intuitive, but they are sensitive to the assumptions
on production technology and market structure. In a new trade model with increasing
returns to scale and monopolistic competition, the equilibrium price falls and the variety
of products available to consumers rises in both countries as borders open up, provided
that the average degrees of self-control in the two countries are similar. A lower price
and a larger variety benet the fully self-controlled individuals, while they may hurt
consumers with a lack of willpower in both countries. What is quite surprising, however,
is that even the fully rational individuals can lose in such a setting. This will be the case
if they start trading with a country inhabited by overly self-controlled individuals and
if the negative eect of a rising average degree of self-control on the available product
variety dominates the positive eect of an increasing market size.
One real world example where self-control problems matter for the welfare eects of
trade and where government action is required to make trade a Pareto-improvement over
autarky is the case of trade in cigarettes. The empirical evidence on self-control problems
with regard to smoking is strong, and the eects of trade on the consumption of cigarettes
as well as the health consequences are well documented. The case of Taiwan demonstrates
that losses from trade in cigarettes due to self-control problems do indeed occur. Yet,
the theoretical analysis also qualies for trade in other goods, such as unhealthy food, as
mentioned in the beginning, or alcohol. For instance, after Sweden joined the European
Union in 1995, it gradually liberalized trade in alcohol. The result were falling prices
27and an increased variety, which are partly responsible for an upsurge in alcohol abuse
in Sweden (Daley, 2001). Similarly, when Finland opened up its borders to Estonia in
2004 within the framework of the expansion of the European Union, nearly unlimited
amounts of low priced alcohol became available, with adverse eects on Finish public
health (Finish Ministry of Social Aairs and Health, 2006).
The preceding analysis suggests that in all of these cases, the welfare eects of trade
liberalization may be less positive than traditional models suggest. It provides a rst
hint at which factors actually matter for the distribution of the gains from trade across
individuals and across countries when individuals have self-control problems and can serve
as a point of reference for policy recommendations.
Certainly, the analysis can be rened. So far, I have abstracted away from hetero-
geneity in tastes, and this may be an important determinant of whether taxes or taris
are Pareto-improving, as O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) have shown. Possible extensions
of the model include the introduction of income eects, in combination with borrowings
and savings. Such eects might be rather irrelevant for smoking, but they are certainly
important for more expensive goods such as illicit drugs. Including income eects does
however make a welfare analysis with time-inconsistent agents an even more serious issue,
given that utility units cannot simply be expressed in terms of income or a num eraire
good. An alternative way to connect dierent periods of time is to remove the functional
separability between immediate benets and future costs. This is for example what Gru-
ber and K oszegi (2004) do when they analyze the welfare eects of taxes on addictive
goods. If consumption decisions of dierent periods are connected, it matters whether
individuals are aware of their self-control problem or not, and this may have interesting
implications also for trade. In addition, the connection between dierent periods of time
opens up the possibility for intertemporal trade, and this also seems worth to analyze.
Finally and most importantly, more empirical research is needed, especially with respect
to the distribution of the self-control parameter  within a population and across coun-
tries, to determine how many individuals lose, and what is the magnitude of their losses.
To conclude, there is much need and room for further research, empirical as well as theo-
retical, and taking into account new insights from behavioral economics in international
trade theory promises new results.
28Appendix
Proof of proposition 4. Note that if assumption 2 is satised in autarky, i.e. for  
and L, it will also be satised under trade, i.e. for  T = ( L+  FLF)=(L+LF)    and
LT = L + LF  L where  F and LF denote the average degree of self-control and the
mass of consumers in the foreign country, respectively. Then the gains from trade for an
individual with self-control parameter  are
G =
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If   2   (  
q
F
L )=, then   2   (  
q
F
L+LF )= for all LF  0, which is
equivalent to      
q
F
LT   2(1   )  0 and @G
@  F  0. If, in addition,  F   , then
all terms in equation (21) are positive and @G
@LF > 0. Given that the gains from trade are
zero for  F =   and LF = 0, they must be strictly positive for all  F    and all LF > 0.
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